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MEN AND WOMEN BY ARTIFICIAL
REPRODUCTION STATUTES
Jack F. Williams*
[The Constitution] is made for people of fundamentally differing views,
and the accident of our finding certain opinions natural and familiar or
novel and even shocking ought not to conclude our judgment upon the
question whether statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitu-
tion of the United States.**
I. INTRODUCTION
For the law to remain relevant it must progress as society pro-
gresses. Advances in science and technology must be followed by ad-
vances in the law. This Essay will focus on two particular advances in
science and technology-artificial insemination by donor and surrogate
motherhood-and the laws relevant to these two methods of artificial
reproduction. Specifically, the Essay will discuss the differential treat-
ment of infertile men and women by artificial reproduction statutes.
As will be noted, most jurisdictions have enacted statutes providing
that children born by the AID process be deemed legitimate and estab-
lishing that the husband1 of the natural mother of the AID child be
deemed the natural and legal father. However, no such statutes exist for
surrogate motherhood arrangements. Therefore, a child born from a sur-
* U.S. Coast Guard Academy; B.A., University of Oklahoma; University of Tulsa; J.D. with
high honors, George Washington University. The author currently serves as a law clerk to the
Honorable William J. Holloway, Jr., Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
** Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
1. The terms "mother" and "father" contain within them assumptions that most of us take for
granted. Thus, use of the term "husband" rather than "father" reflects the lack of a word to de-
scribe adequately the difference in the roles of these two men in the artificial reproduction scenario.
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rogate motherhood arrangement will be born illegitimate absent a saving
statute;2 the wife of the natural father must adopt the child to be deemed
the legal mother.'
The Essay will first explore the typical AID and surrogate mother-
hood procedures. To understand fully their legal implications one must
become familiar with the medical techniques and procedures used. Sec-
ond, the Essay will discuss the differences in the law's treatment of the
two artificial reproduction procedures. Finally, the differences in treat-
ment will be analyzed with an eye toward possible constitutional viola-
tions due to the unequal treatment of infertile men and women.
II. ARTIFICIAL REPRODUCTIVE METHODS
A. Artificial Insemination by Donor
1. Medical Process
Today, artificial insemination is a widely accepted nonexperimental
procedure. The process generally entails the introduction of male sperm
into a female patient with a needleless hypodermic syringe.4 Presently,
three approaches to artificial insemination exist. First, when insemina-
tion is accomplished with the husband's sperm, the procedure is identi-
fied as Artificial Insemination Homologous (AIH).' Second, when
insemination is accomplished with a donor's sperm, the procedure is la-
beled Artificial Insemination Heterologous (AID).' Third, when insemi-
nation is accomplished with a mixture of the husband's sperm and a
donor's sperm, the procedure is called Confused Artificial Insemination
(CAI).7  With all three procedures, fertilization occurs inside the
2. For a typical saving statute, see D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-908 (1981). This section states that
"[a] child born in wedlock or born out of wedlock is the legitimate child of its father and mother and
is the legitimate relative of its father's and mother's relatives by blood or adoption." Id.
3. In this sense, adoption may be viewed as a "burden" placed upon the wife of the natural
father.
4. See THE BOSTON WOMEN'S HEALTH BOOK COLLECTIVE, THE NEW OUR BODIES, OUR-
SELVES 318 (1984); Palm & Hirsh, Legal Implications of Artficial Conception, 1982 MED. TRIAL
TECH. Q. 404, 406; Wadlington, Artificial Conception: The Challenge for Family Law, 69 VA. L.
REV. 465, 468 (1983).
5. AIH may be used when normal copulation fails because of various medical problems. See
Carson & Batzer, Homologous Artificial Insemination, 26 J. REPRODUCTIVE MED. 231 (1981).
6. AID, at least to married couples, is presumed not to be the first alternative. AID, however,
may be used either if the husband is sterile or fears transmitting genetic disease. See W. FINEGOLD,
ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION 18 (2d ed. 1976); Palm & Hirsh, supra note 4, at 407.
7. CAI is often cynically referred to as the "French firing squad technique." One justification
for CAI contemplates a possible psychological benefit to a sterile husband who might rationalize that
he has fathered the child conceived by his wife. Wadlington, supra note 4, at 469. One author
suggests, however, that this structural fantasy exposes those men who would be poor AID candi-
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mother's body and not in the laboratory. This Essay will concern itself
with AID, for this particular procedure presents the legal issues most
analogous to those generated by surrogate motherhood.
AID technology has been progressing rapidly since the first reported
case in America in 1884.8 Even before this incident, however, artificial
insemination in farm animals was a growing practice. Presently, through
modern cryogenic capabilities, semen can be frozen and stored for future
use in sperm banks.9 Some banks operate as commercial enterprises with
little or no licensing requirements. Donor"0 selection is also largely un-
regulated. Many studies have shown that the recordkeeping with regard
to donors is minimal.1"
Only four people are directly concerned in the AID process-the
mother, her husband, the donor, and, in most cases, the physician.12 The
husband is the only participant not playing an active role in the process.
The AID child is not considered a participant, but is rather the product
of the process.
2. Legal Treatment of AID
Among the legal issues13 considered by courts in cases involving
AID are adultery, the legal status of the child, and the parental status of
the parties involved (donor, husband, and wife). Historically, AID has
been viewed as an undesirable method of procreation. In 1945, a com-
mission appointed by the Archbishop of Canterbury strongly criticized
AID and recommended that it be made a criminal offense.1 4 In a report
dates. A. GUrTMACHER, W. BEST & F. JAFFE, BIRTH CONTROL AND LOVE: THE COMPLETE
GUIDE TO CONTRACEPTION AND FERTILITY 279-80 (2d rev. ed. 1969).
8. R. SNOWDEN & G.D. MITCHELL, THE ARTIFICIAL FAMILY 13 (1981).
9. For an interesting review of sperm banking in the U.S., see HUMAN ARTIFICIAL INSEMINA-
TION AND SEMEN PRESERVATION (G. David & W. Price ed. 1980).
10. "It has long been known that the term 'donor' is a euphemism and that, in fact 'donors'
receive standard payments for 'donations' in various localities." Wadlington, supra note 4, at 471.
For an interesting profile of a sperm donor, see Yagoda, Daddy?, CAMPUS VOICE, Feb.-Mar. 1985, at
46.
11. See Curie-Coehn, Luttrell & Shapiro, Current Practice of Artificial Insemination by Donor
in the United States, 300 NEW ENG. J. MED. 585 (1979).
12. Although a physician is not necessary to artificially impregnate a woman, many statutes
require that a physician perform the artificial insemination. See GA. CODE ANN. § 74-101.1(a)
(Supp. 1985).
13. Of course, AID generates more than legal issues. There are ethical and religious issues
which are as compelling as their legal counterparts. Many ethicists have stated their profound aver-
sion to artificial manipulation of a natural process so closely tied to the mystery of life. See generally
P. RAMSEY, FABRICATED MAN: THE ETHICS OF GENETIC CONTROL (1970). Both the Roman
Catholic and Orthodox Jewish teachings consider AID adultery. THE BOSTON WOMEN'S HEALTH
BooK COLLECTIVE, supra note 4, at 319.
14. R. SNOWDEN & G.D. MITCHELL, supra note 8, at 15.
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published in 1960, the United Kingdom Feversham Committee also con-
cluded that AID was an undesirable practice.15
AID was first considered by a North American court in 1921 in
Orford v. Orford.16 In Orford, the Supreme Court of Ontario expressed
the view in dictum that a wife's submission to AID without her hus-
band's consent would constitute adultery. The court stated that the es-
sence of the offense of adultery was not so much the joinder of sexual
organs as it was "the voluntary surrender... of the reproductive powers
or faculties" by the wife to someone other than her husband.1 7  A
broader conclusion was reached by an Illinois trial court in 1954, which
held that a child conceived by AID with or without the husband's con-
sent constituted adultery and that the child so conceived would be illegit-
imate.18 Not until the opinion of Lord Wheatley in a 1958 Scottish
Court of Sessions case was AID viewed as not adulterous. Lord Wheat-
ley stated that "[u]nilateral adultery is possible, as in the case of a mar-
ried man who ravishes a woman not his wife, but self-adultery is a
concept as yet unknown to the law."19 Noting that adultery is concerned
with the means and not the end result, the court held that AID even
without the husband's consent was not equivalent to the physical contact
proscribed by adultery. In People v. Sorensen,2" the California Supreme
Court, in confirming a conviction under a criminal nonsupport statute,
also concluded that AID was not adultery.21 The Sorensen approach is
the modem view in the United States.
At common law, the AID child would have been illegitimate absent
a contrary statutory or common law presumption22 or a saving statute.23
Gursky v. Gursky24 is a case in point. In Gursky, the New York Supreme
15. Id.
16. 58 D.L.R. 251 (Ont. 1921).
17. Id. at 258.
18. Doornbos v. Doombos, 23 U.S.L.W. 2308 (Super. Ct., Cook County, Ill., 1954), affd, 139
N.E.2d 844 (1956). The court, however, found no difficulty with AIH from a legal point of view.
19. MacLennan v. MacLennan, 1958 Sess. Cas. 105, 114.
20. 68 Cal. 2d 280, 437 P.2d 495, 66 Cal. Rptr. 7 (1968) (en banc).
21. The court dismissed the idea that the doctor or donor and the wife commit adultery
through the artificial insemination process, stating:
Since the doctor may be a woman, or the husband himself may administer the insemination
by a syringe, this is patently absurd; to consider it an act of adultery with the donor, who at
the time of insemination may be a thousand miles away or may even be dead, is equally
absurd.
Id. at -, 437 P.2d at 501, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 13.
22. For a typical presumption of legitimacy applicable to a child born during wedlock, see
Kusior v. Silver, 54 Cal. 2d 603, 354 P.2d 657, 7 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1960) (en banc).
23. See supra note 2 for an example of a saving statute.
24. 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
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Court viewed the AID child as illegitimate and noted that AID did not
adhere to and satisfy the requirements of the state adoption statute.25
Presently, many states provide by statute that an AID child shall have
the same status as a naturally conceived child so long as both husband
and wife consented to the procedure.26 These statutes generally classify
the husband as the child's natural father,27 although such a result is a
medical impossibility.
People v. Sorensen,28 the case espousing the modem views on AID
and adultery, is also the leading case as to the issue of paternity. In
Sorensen, the California Supreme Court held that a husband who con-
sented to AID was the child's lawful father and was to be registered as
such on the birth certificate even if sterile.29 Furthermore, in In re Adop-
tion of Anonymous,3 ° a husband who had consented to AID was deemed
a parent whose consent was needed to allow the wife's new husband to
adopt the AID child.31 As previously noted, the modem trend is for a
jurisdiction to have an AID statute making the husband who consents to
AID the natural father of the child.32
Thus, in summary, absent a saving statute, a presumption of legiti-
macy, or an AID statute, an AID child is born illegitimate. However,
the trend is to provide by statute that an AID child be deemed legitimate
and that the husband of the mother be deemed the natural father of the
child without resort to an adoption procedure.
25. See Strnad v. Strnad, 190 Misc. 786, 78 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Sup. Ct. 1948). In Strnad, the court
stated that an AID child had been potentially adopted or semi-adopted by a husband consenting to
artificial insemination, even though adoption has always been statutory. Id. at _, 78 N.Y.S.2d at
391-92.
26. See, eg., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-69f to -69n (West 1981); GA. CODE ANN. § 74-
101.1 (Supp. 1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-128 to -129 (1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49A-I (1984);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, §§ 551-553 (1981).
27. See, eg., CAL. CIV. CODE § 7005 (West 1983); GA. CODE ANN. § 74-101.1 (Supp. 1985);
LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 188 (West Supp. 1985); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.243 (1983).
28. 68 Cal. 2d at 280, 437 P.2d at 495, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 7.
29. Id. at -, 437 P.2d at 500, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 12.
30. 74 Misc. 2d 99, 345 N.Y.S.2d 430 (Sur. Ct. 1973).
31. Id. at -, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 435-36.
32. There has also been considerable debate among commentators about the potential rights
and responsibilities of donors. In C.M. v. C.C., 152 N.J. Super. 160, 377 A.2d 821 (Juv. & Dom.
Rel. Ct. 1977), a New Jersey court granted a semen donor visitation rights to a child conceived by an
unmarried woman impregnated by his sperm. In that case, the donor and the woman knew each
other. Section 5 of the Uniform Parentage Act explicitly provides that a donor of semen will not be
regarded as the legal father of the child. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5(b), 9A U.L.A. 592-93 (1979).
For an interesting discussion of when it may be in the best interests of an AID child to learn of the
donor's identity, see Smith, The Razor's Edge of Human Bonding: Artificial Fathers and Surrogate
Mothers, 5 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 639, 648 (1983).
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Surrogate motherhood is a generic term which can refer to several
techniques, including one in which gestation takes place in a womb other
than that of the egg donor. This technique may be used when pregnancy
would be hazardous, impossible, or undesirable.33 A woman in this situ-
ation could have ova removed from her body, fertilized in vitro,34 and
then implanted into the womb of a surrogate mother who would carry
the baby to term.35 However, the popular version of surrogate mother-
hood occurs when a woman conceives a child by AID, carries the baby to
term, and relinquishes it to the sperm donor after birth in accordance
with a preconception agreement. In most cases, the sperm donor's wife
will adopt the child. In this latter scenario, surrogate motherhood has
been regarded as the "female counterpart to AID."36 As with AID, this
version of surrogate motherhood is largely technologically independent.
The surrogate motherhood agreement is primarily a relationship
based on contract principles.37 The surrogate contracts to conceive the
child of the husband by means of artificial insemination in return for
expenses and, usually, a fee. Thus, the surrogate motherhood agreement
requires the making of personal choices and commitments months in ad-
vance of performance.38
Four people are directly concerned in the surrogate motherhood
process-the father, his wife, the surrogate mother, and, in most cases,
the physician.39 The wife is generally the only participant not playing an
active role in the process." Like the AID child, the surrogate mother-
hood child is not considered a participant, but is rather the product of
the process.
33. A woman who would use this type of surrogate motherhood arrangement is typically one
who is fertile but has a heart condition, partial paralysis, or a history of miscarriages, or who cannot
interrupt a career for pregnancy. Palm & Hirsh, supra note 4, at 414.
34. Unlike AID, in vitro fertilization (IVF) is technologically dependent. IVF requires extrac-
tion of a ripe egg from an ovary, fertilization in a glass dish, and implantation back into the womb.
THE BOSTON WOMEN'S HEALTH BOOK COLLECTIVE, supra note 4, at 320.
35. There are several documented reasons given for becoming a surrogate mother. The first is
that acting as a surrogate satisfies some sentimental or maternal instinct. The other reasons are
based on altruism, financial need, and a fascination with pregnancy. Smith, supra note 32, at 649-50.
36. Id. at 649.
37. See Note, Surrogate Motherhood: Contractual Issues and Remedies Under Legislative Pro-
posals, 23 WASHBURN L.J. 601, 602 (1984).
38. See Comment, Surrogate Mother Agreements: Contemporary Legal Aspects of a Biblical
Notion, 16 U. RICH. L. REV. 467, 469 (1982).
39. See supra note 12.
40. Of course, this is not true when the wife's egg is transplanted into the womb of a surrogate.
[Vol. 21:463
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2. Legal Treatment of Surrogate Motherhood
As previously stated, the surrogate motherhood arrangement is
based on contract principles. However, several legal obstacles to surro-
gate motherhood agreements exist. In at least twenty-four states, paying
a mother to give up a child for adoption is unlawful.4" For example, in
Doe v. Attorney General,42 the Michigan Court of Appeals held that the
Michigan "baby brokering" law43 prohibited payment to a surrogate
mother in connection with an adoption. The court held that a couple's
fundamental right to make procreative decisions encompassed the right
to bear a child with the aid of a third party-the surrogate.' However,
the court held that this constitutional right did not give the surrogate the
right to bear a child for pay or to use the adoption laws to transfer the
child to the contracting couple.45 On the other hand, in Surrogate
Parenting Associates, Inc. v. Commonwealth ex rel. Armstrong,46 the Ken-
tucky Supreme Court found fundamental differences between the surro-
gate parenting procedure and the buying and selling of children. These
differences included the "central fact [that] in the surrogate parenting
procedure.., the agreement to bear the child is entered into before con-
ception" and the surrogate's primary motivation for agreeing to the pro-
cedure is not to relieve herself of the burden of childrearing, but to help a
couple have a biologically related child.47 The Surrogate Parenting ra-
tionale appears to be the more compelling, as a surrogate motherhood
arrangement is not what the legislatures had in mind when they enacted
the baby selling laws. Furthermore, if one is to assume, as the Michigan
Court of Appeals has, that the right to procreative decisions encompasses
the right to bear a child with the aid of a surrogate, then it would seem
only logical that the surrogate be paid for the services she performs. Any
other result is not only detrimental to the collaborative right of procrea-
tion, but also ill-fated because it will force surrogate arrangements into
41. Andrews, The Stork Market: The Law of the New Reproduction Technologies, A.B.A. J.,
Aug. 1984, at 50, 52. The typical fee for surrogate services is $10,000 plus all medical, legal, and
insurance costs. Gelman & Shapiro, Infertility: Babies by Contract, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 4, 1985, at
74. A couple can expect to pay $25,000 to $30,000 overall. Id. at 75.
42. 106 Mich. App. 169, 307 N.W.2d 438 (1981).
43. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 710.54 (West Supp. 1985).
44. 106 Mich. App. at 173, 307 N.W.2d at 441.
45. Id.
46. No. 85-SC-421-DG (Ky. Feb. 6, 1986). The action arose when the state attempted to re-
voke petitioner's corporate charter for abuse and misuse of corporate powers. Id. at 1. The state
alleged that petitioner's surrogate parenting procedures violated state laws prohibiting the sale of
babies. Id. at 1-2.
47. Id. at 5-6 (emphasis in original).
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hiding. Although the surrogate will appear to provide her services altru-
istically, financial arrangements will be made under the table.
Yet another obstacle to surrogate motherhood is the AID statutes.
These statutes specifically provide that a sperm donor is not the legal
father of a child conceived by the artificial insemination of a woman not
his wife.48 This obstacle, however, is mere fantasy. The purposes of AID
statutes are to make the AID child legitimate49 and to make the con-
senting husband of the mother the child's natural father."0 AID statutes
were not passed to regulate situations in which the sperm donor was
known and did indeed wish to be the legal father."
In Syrkowski v. Appleyard, 2 the Michigan Court of Appeals strictly
applied the state's paternity act to deny an attempt by a husband sperm
donor to use a custody proceeding to validate a surrogate arrangement.5 3
The court stated:
We view the surrogate mother arrangements with caution as we
approach an unexplored area in the law which, without a doubt, can
have a profound effect on the lives of our people. The courts should
not be called upon to enlarge the scope of The Paternity Act to encom-
pass circumstances never contemplated thereby. Studied legislation is
needed before surrogate arrangements are recognized as proposed
under the facts submitted herein.54
The Michigan Supreme Court later reversed the court of appeals, stating
that the trial court had jurisdiction under the state's paternity act to al-
low the plaintiff Syrkowski to prove paternity.55 It may be an overstate-
ment to conclude that Syrkowski itself legalizes surrogate motherhood;
however, the trend is undeniably toward making surrogate motherhood
arrangements legal and viable exercises of the right of procreation. Pres-
ently, twenty-one jurisdictions are considering surrogate motherhood
legislation. 6 Of these jurisdictions, only four are considering prohibiting
the surrogate process.57
48. See supra notes 26-27.
49. See Comment, supra note 38, at 472.
50. See Andrews, supra note 41, at 53.
51. Cf. C.M. v. C.C., 152 N.J. Super. 160, 377 A.2d 821 (Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. 1977) (court
granted sperm donor whose identity was known to unwed mother visitation rights to AID child).
52. 122 Mich. App. 506, 333 N.W.2d 90 (1983).
53. Id. at 509, 333 N.W.2d at 91.
54. Id. at 515, 333 N.W.2d at 94 (footnote omitted).
55. Syrkowski v. Appleyard, 420 Mich. 367, 362 N.W.2d 211 (1985).
56. 11 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 3001, 3003 (Jan. 29, 1985).
57. Id. at 3003. One commentator has expressed the view that surrogate motherhood violates
the thirteenth amendment prohibition against slavery-sale of one person by another. Holder, Sur-
rogate Motherhood: Babies for Fun and Profit, CAss & CoM., Mar.-Apr. 1985, at 3, 9. This view, I
believe, shows a fundamental lack of understanding of surrogate motherhood.
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Thus, in summary, assuming that surrogate motherhood is lawful, a
child born from this process may nevertheless be deemed illegitimate ab-
sent a surrogate motherhood statute58 or saving statute. Furthermore,
the wife of the father is not deemed the natural parent of the child as is
her male AID counterpart. Instead, for her to obtain the rights and re-
sponsibilities of a natural parent, she must adopt the child of her
husband. 9
III. EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS UNDER THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
A. Sex-Based Classifications
The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution states,
in part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privi-
leges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.60
What this passage means has been and will always be the subject of great
debate. Most commentators are in agreement, however, that the purpose
of the equal protection clause is to protect those people excluded from
the political process or, as has more recently been the case, to protect
those rights viewed as fundamental in our society.
61
An argument can be advanced that AID statutes violate the equal
protection clause because they allow infertile men to exercise their right
of procreation with the aid of a third party donor while not encompass-
ing the right of infertile women to exercise their right of procreation with
the aid of a third party surrogate. Although it must be recognized that
the state has particularly broad powers regarding the rights and status of
parents and children, the power of the state is necessarily subject to the
demands of the equal protection clause.6 2
58. For example, Maryland House of Delegates Bill No. 1552, proposed during the 1985 ses-
sion, would have provided that all children born by the surrogate motherhood process are legiti-
mate. H.D. 1552, 1985 Md. Leg.
59. Technically, the wife could use a streamlined procedure for a stepparent adoption in a
jurisdiction that recognizes such a procedure. See Andrews, supra note 41, at 52.
60. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
61. See generally J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW(1980).
62. See, e.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (Court struck down on equal protec-
tion grounds a New York statute allowing unwed mother, but not unwed father, to block adoption of
child by withholding consent).
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In analyzing whether AID statutes violate the Constitution, one
must first determine the proper standard for reviewing the classification
created by these statutes. Since Craig v. Boren,63 the standard for review
has been settled, at least in theory. "To withstand constitutional chal-
lenge, previous cases establish that classifications by gender must serve
important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to
achievement of those objectives."" This standard of review, however,
presupposes that the court has found a gender-based classification. Such
an observation begs the question. What is a gender-based classification?
Section 5 of the Uniform Parentage Act65 (U.P.A.) provides:
(a) If, under the supervision of a licensed physician and with the
consent of her husband, a wife is inseminated artificially with semen
donated by a man not her husband, the husband is treated in law as if
he were the natural father of a child thereby conceived. The husband's
consent must be in writing and signed by him and his wife. The physi-
cian shall certify their signatures and the date of the insemination, and
file the husband's consent with the [State Department of Health],
where it shall be kept confidential and in a sealed file. However, the
physician's failure to do so does not affect the father and child relation-
ship. All papers and records pertaining to the insemination, whether
part of the permanent record of a court or of a file held by the supervis-
ing physician or elsewhere, are subject to inspection only upon an or-
der of the court for good cause shown.
(b) The donor of semen provided to a licensed physician for use
in artificial insemination of a married woman other than the donor's
wife is treated in law as if he were not the natural father of a child
thereby conceived.66
Section 5 has had a great influence on subsequent AID statutes in the
United States. It will serve, therefore, as a useful statutory model in our
equal protection analysis. Section 5 confers a benefit to infertile married
men. That is, a married man who consents to have his wife artificially
inseminated by a donor will, upon the birth of a child, be "treated in law
as if he were the natural father."67 Again, is this a gender-based
classification?
The answer to this pivotal question might appear quite simple to
63. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
64. Id. at 197 (emphasis added); see also Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 316-17 (1977)
(applying the Craig standard to challenged provisions of Social Security Act).
65. 9A U.L.A. 592-93 (1979). The U.P.A. was approved by the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws in 1973 and by the A.B.A. House of Delegates in 1974.
66. Id. (emphasis added).
67. Id. § 5(a). Section 5 also confers benefits on the wife of the infertile man because she can
exercise her right of procreation and on the AID child who will be presumed legitimate.
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novices in the constitutional field; a gender-based classification is one that
is based on men and women and the differences between them. To those
commentators well-versed in the law, however, the answer is not so sim-
ple. At least since Geduldig v. Aiello 68 and Personnel Administrator v.
Feeney,69 the answer, although fundamental, has often proved mysteri-
ous. A statute that discriminates on its face between men and women is
gender-based.7" However, under Aiello, a statute that discriminates be-
tween pregnant and non-pregnant persons is not a gender-based classifi-
cation.7" This is true even though to date only women can become
pregnant, and, therefore, only women can be harmed by pregnancy.
Thus, a characteristic as closely associated with gender as pregnancy is
not the basis of a gender-based classification. The conclusion that preg-
nancy-based classifications are not in themselves gender-based may sug-
gest an exceedingly formalistic view. This, nevertheless, is the view of a
majority of the Supreme Court.
The pivotal question then becomes whether AID statutes more
closely resemble Craig-type or Aiello-type statutes. A few examples may
help to shed light on this issue. In Aiello, we know that the difference
between pregnant and non-pregnant persons is not gender-based. But
what if the Court were confronted with a medical disability plan that
differentiated between vasectomies and hysterectomies or between male
and female breast cancer? In these examples we have something more
than an Aiello-type classification because the distinctions are gender-
based. So, too, is the distinction drawn by AID statutes. AID statutes
confer a benefit to infertile men in the form of an irrebuttable presump-
tion. Men who consent to the AID process are treated as the legal parent
of the child. This is so even though the child could not possibly be the
offspring of the infertile man. Thus, AID statutes create a legal fiction
which benefits infertile married men and permits them to exercise their
68. 417 U.S. 484 (1974). Aiello involved a state statute establishing a disability insurance sys-
tem for private employees. Plaintiffs challenged the statute as underinclusive on equal protection
grounds for its failure to insure the risk of disability from a normal pregnancy. The Supreme Court
upheld the statute. Id. at 494.
69. 442 U.S. 256 (1979). In Feeney, plaintiff challenged a state hiring and promotion statute
favoring veterans for civil service positions. Although the statute operated "overwhelmingly to the
advantage of males," the Court upheld the statute against an equal protection challenge. Id. at 259.
70. See Craig, 429 U.S. at 197; Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76-77 (1971). But see Kahn v.
Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 352 (1974) (upholding a Florida statute providing for a property tax exemp-
tion for widows).
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fundamental right of procreation. No such benefit is conferred upon in-
fertile married women.
Assuming that AID statutes as written fall under the Craig classifi-
cation, they cannot be saved merely because an infertile woman may take
steps to adopt the child and, thus, attain the rights conferred by the AID
statutes to infertile men. The argument goes on to say that if a woman
fails to take advantage of the procedures available, she should not be
heard to complain of the discriminatory impact of AID statutes. But this
type of argument was expressly rejected in Kirchberg v. Feenstra.2 In
Kirchberg, the Supreme Court invalidated a statute that gave a husband,
as head and master of property jointly owned with his wife, the unilateral
right to dispose of the property without his spouse's consent. The state's
view was that the statutory scheme was not unconstitutional because it
provided a procedure whereby the wife could have made a "declaration
by authentic act" and stopped the disposition of the property.73 The
additional procedure also required that the declaration be filed in the
mortgage and conveyance records of the parish in which the property
was located.74 The Court stated that "the 'absence of an insurmountable
barrier' will not redeem an otherwise unconstitutionally discriminatory
law."75 The rationale in Kirchberg is compelling. AID statutes confer
certain rights upon infertile men and, by implication, withhold those
same rights from infertile women. Infertile women could obtain the
same rights given to infertile men automatically by statute, by engaging
in the additional procedure of adoption. Certainly, in many cases adop-
tion is not an insurmountable barrier.76 However, under Kirchberg, the
goal need not be unattainable.
One may advance the argument that whatever the impact, without
discriminatory legislative motives, AID statutes should be declared con-
stitutional.77 This would be the case had we been confronted with a gen-
der-neutral statute as in Feeney, but as previously noted, AID statutes
are not and cannot be construed as gender-neutral. Infertile men and
women are similarly situated. Neither can exercise their right of procrea-
tion without the aid of a third party semen donor or surrogate. Only
72. 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981).
73. Id. at 460-61.
74. Id. at 460 n.8.,
75. Id. at 461 (citations omitted).
76. This is not the case with an unmarried woman or a woman engaged in a lesbian relation-
ship. Moreover, couples seeking surrogates have usually exhausted the possibility of adoption. See
Gelman & Shapiro, supra note 41, at 74.
77. Accord Feeney, 442 U.S. at 272.
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infertile men, however, are entitled to the special rights afforded by AID
statutes.78
A finding that AID statutes are unconstitutional because they vio-
late the equal protection clause is supported by the traditional Tussman-
tenBroek equal protection model.7 9 Under the Tussman-tenBroek model,
one must look beyond the classification to the purpose of the law in ques-
tion .8 The purpose of AID statutes is the achievement of some positive
public good. Specifically, AID statutes provide a means whereby a
couple who cannot conceive a child can, in fact, have a child with the aid
of a donor. This child will be deemed legitimate and the husband treated
as the natural father. Tussman and tenBroek speak of the relation of the
classification to the purpose of the law as the relation of the "trait" to the
"mischief. ' 81 In our case, the trait is all males who are married and
infertile or who carry a hereditary disease. The mischief is to help infer-
tile couples have a child part "theirs" whose legal parents are the mother
(wife) and her husband (father).
The usual equal protection problem concerns the relation of two
classes to one another.8 2 The first class consists of all individuals possess-
ing the defining traitS3-in this case, all married men who are infertile or
who have a hereditary disease. The second class consists of all individu-
als tainted by the mischief at which the law aims 4--in this case, all mar-
ried men and women who are infertile or who carry hereditary diseases,
who want a child of "their" own who is deemed legitimate, and who
want to be treated as the natural parents. The first class is defined by the
legislative classification drawn by AID statutes, while the second class
78. It is relevant to note that the first AID statute was passed in the early 1960's when women
were not a politically active group. In terms of reproduction, women have been the victims of dis-
crimination as far back as the Old Testament. See L. GORDON, WOMAN'S BODY, WOMAN'S RIGHT:
A SOCIAL HISTORY OF BIRTH CONTROL IN AMERICA 1-46 (1976). American women began their
quest for reproductive freedom with the birth control movement of the mid-nineteenth century. See
Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy, and Childbirth, 69 VA. L.
REv. 405, 405 (1983). For an interesting discussion of the background of birth control in the United
States, see L. GORDON, supra. The law's response to the childbearing issue marks a pivotal point in
the emergence of women as first class citizens. Scales, Towards a Feminist Jurisprudence, 56 IND.
L.J. 375, 376 (1981). Yet, as Professor Ely notes, "exaggerated stereotyping ... has long been
rampant throughout the male population and consequently in our almost exclusively male legisla-
tures in particular." J. ELY, supra note 61, at 164. "Absent a strong demonstration of mitigating
factors, therefore, we would have to treat gender-based classifications that act to the disadvantage of
women as suspicious." Id.
79. Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341 (1949).
80. Id. at 346.
81. Id.
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consists of those individuals similarly situated with respect to the pur-
poses of the AID statutes.
Tussman and tenBroek then talk of five possible relationships be-
tween the trait and the mischief.85 Relationship three is applicable to our
case; that is, the AID statutes are underinclusive. All who are included
in the class are tainted with the mischief, but others who are tainted are
not included within the classification. Therefore, a prima facie violation
of the equal protection clause has been shown. 86 The question then be-
comes to what degree a legislature should be permitted to generalize or
to deal with portions of a problem at a time and thus to fall short of
perfect congruence. Whatever that exact figure may be, a fifty percent
congruency is too inexact. The fact that over fifty percent of all infertil-
ity is traceable to the woman becomes paramount.87 Thus, sex is not a
sufficiently accurate proxy for infertility. Granted, legislatures are not
required to meet perfect congruency; however, when the classification is
sex-based, such a great amount of incongruency is intolerable. Further-
more, "[l]egislative classifications which distribute benefits and burdens
on the basis of gender carry the inherent risk of reinforcing stereotypes
about the 'proper place' of women and their need for special
protection. ' 88
This result is highlighted by the use of a technique articulated in Orr
v. Orr.89 In Orr, the Supreme Court directly analogized race discrimina-
tion to sex discrimination. "There is no question but that Mr. Orr bears
a burden he would not bear were he female. The issue is highlighted,
although not altered, by transposing it to the sphere of race."9 An artifi-
cial reproduction statute providing that infertile white men would be
treated as the natural father of a child while denying the same benefit to
infertile black men would be clearly unconstitutional. The result should
be no less in this case. It is important to note that even under the tradi-
tional Tussman-tenBroek equal protection model, the classification
85. Id. Tussman and tenBroek use Venn diagrams to demonstrate ideal limits of reasonable-
ness, unreasonableness, underinclusiveness, overinclusiveness, and both over- and underinclusive-
ness. Id.
86. Id. at 348.
87. TExTBoOK OF MED CINE 1780 (P. Beeson & W. McDermott 14th ed. 1975). This source
attributes 40% of all infertility to men and 70% to women. (A total in excess of 100% indicates
multiple causes of infertility.) Id.; see also Palm & Hirsh, supra note 4, at 404.
88. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S! 268, 283 (1979) (citation omitted).
89. Id. at 268. Appellant, ordered to pay alimony to his wife upon divorce, challenged on equal
protection grounds Alabama statutes that could require husbands, but not wives, to pay alimony.
Id. at 271.
90. Id. at 273 (emphasis added); see also Scales, supra note 78, at 393.
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would be unconstitutional. Thus, a fortiori, the classification would be
unconstitutional under most of the more liberal feminist equality
models.91
B. Application of the Middle Tier Approach
After the case has been made that AID statutes discriminate against
infertile women,9" the burden is on the party seeking to uphold the AID
statute (in this case, the state) to advance an "exceedingly persuasive jus-
tification for the challenged classification." 93 The governmental interests
in enacting AID statutes are to preserve marriage between an infertile
couple,94 to codify certain common law presumptions,95 to provide for
the legitimacy of AID children, 96 to avoid transmission of genetic dis-
ease,97 and to promote collaborative procreation.98  The fundamental
question is whether these reasons convert into important governmental
objectives and whether the AID statute is substantially related to the
achievement of these objectives. 99 It is important to note that the test is
phrased in the conjunctive; therefore, both conditions must be met.
Do the proffered governmental reasons convert into important gov-
ernmental objectives? Certainly all five reasons are legitimate. The latter
three may also be important. Certainly the right to procreate is not only
91. See Scales, supra note 78, at 434-35. The author recognizes that in utero pregnancy is a
difference between the sexes that cannot be ignored. But this does not negate gender-neutral
childrearing or parenting concepts. Under the author's "incorporationist approach," the classifica-
tion drawn by AID statutes would be unconstitutional. Id. at 435.
92. AID statutes also discriminate against the husband of an infertile woman and against any
child born by the surrogate motherhood process. Accord Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977)
(plaintiff was a man complaining of discrimination against his deceased wife).
93. Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981); see also Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Ins.
Co., 446 U.S. 142, 151 (1980) (state's justification for unequal treatment of men and women under
Missouri workers' compensation laws was insufficient to support the statutory advantage).
94. See R. SNOWDEN & G.D. MITCHELL, supra note 8, at 75.
95. The typical presumption relevant here is the Lord Mansfield presumption that a child born
during wedlock is the natural child of his mother and her husband. See Andrews, supra note 41, at
53. Such a presumption is in effect in at least 18 states. Id.
96. This is unequivocally one of the major thrusts of the AID statutes. Note, Artificial Insemi-
nation and Surrogate Motherhood-A Nursery Full of Unresolved Questions, 17 WILLAMETrTE L.
REV. 913, 924-25 (1981). Legitimacy is always in the best interest of the child, and the best interest
of the child is a compelling state interest. See Graham, Surrogate Gestation and the Protection of
Choice, 22 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 291, 304 (1982).
97. See Palm & Hirsh, supra note 4, at 407.
98. Through collaborative conception one can exercise the right of procreation. Robertson,
supra note 78, at 423. For an excellent discussion on the constitutional right of procreation, see id.
at 414-20.
99. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976); see also Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 316-17
(1977).
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important, but also compelling."c° Therefore, at least some of the rea-
sons for AID statutes may be said at first glance to convert into impor-
tant governmental objectives.
Are the AID statutes substantially related to the achievement of the
proffered governmental objectives?"' The only logical and rational an-
swer is no. The AID statutes are grossly underinclusive. If the proffered
reasons for the statutes are important, and we have assumed they are,
then denying their special fights to couples who cannot procreate due to
the woman's infertility frustrates those purposes. 102 Presently, in the
United States, one in six people is affected by infertility.'0 3 More than
one-half of these infertilities are traceable to the woman.'° Therefore,
not encompassing women in AID-like statutes and, thus, requiring them
to adopt a child conceived through a surrogate arrangement frustrates
the articulated purposes of the AID statutes.105
It goes without saying that laws may classify even though classifica-
tion is in a real sense inequality. The Constitution has never required
that things different in fact be treated in law as though they were the
same. Abstract symmetry is not demanded by the Constitution.10 6
Are infertile men and women similarly situated in exercising their
fight of procreation through the aid of a third party? In essence, the
question may be whether surrogate motherhood is the female counter-
part to AID. Cutting through the factual distinctions, the answer by
necessity must be yes, at least until the development of the artificial
womb.107 This is so because the focus must be on the right of procrea-
tion and not on surrogate motherhood as the remedy or means by which
the fight may be exercised.
This is not to say, however, that AID and surrogate motherhood
100. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); Robertson, supra note 78, at 414-20.
101. See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
102. When viewed in this light, the AID statutory scheme seems more ludicrous than it is in
fact. There is no question, however, that the contemporary policy completely frustrates an infertile
woman's right of procreation.
103. Andrews, supra note 41, at 50.
104. See supra note 87.
105. "Ifchildrearing were the sole reason for procreation, adoption might well serve the procrea-
tive needs of infertile persons. rhe urge to procreate, however, usually involves a: desire to transmit
one's own genetic heritage to the child and to participate in gestation and parturition." Robertson,
supra note 78, at 423 (footnote omitted). An adoption proceeding in this context appears absurd.
Furthermore, there is the existence of a birth certificate and other records declaring the adoption of
the child. See R. SNOWDEN & G.D. MITCHELL, supra note 8, at 18.
106. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 540.
107. "The [surrogate] process is not biologically different from the reverse situation where the
husband is infertile and the wife conceives by artificial insemination." Surrogate Parenting Associ-
ates, Inc. v. Commonwealth ex rel. Armstrong, No. 85-SC-421-DG, slip op. at 7 (Ky. Feb. 6, 1986).
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may not be differentiated. For example, the identity of the surrogate in a
surrogate motherhood arrangement is known, while in the typical AID
case the donor is anonymous. 10  Furthermore, the surrogate mother has
greater fetal control."0 9 Although these differences are important, they
are not compelling enough to restrict the rights of infertile women.
"Though the historical subjection of women was premised on biological
differences, the present institutions and customs which rest on that sub-
jection cannot be justified by reference to the 'nature of things.' "110
These factual differences, however, go to the remedy or means by which
a woman exercises her right of procreation. As to the right itself, men
and women are similarly situated. 11
Many criticisms have been leveled against the concept and practice
of surrogate motherhood. Among these criticisms are (1) the physical
harm to the couple or surrogate; (2) the possible mental and physical
harm to the child; (3) the "commercialization" of procreation (e.g., "rent
a womb"); and (4) the fear that surrogate motherhood will confuse fam-
ily lineage and blur the meaning of the traditional family.112 These criti-
cisms, however, are not insurmountable. First, any harm to the couple
or donor can be lessened by requiring a licensed medical practitioner to
perform the medical procedures needed for surrogate motherhood.
States could also require greater information and counselling for the par-
ties about the process. 1 3 Some of these services are already provided for
in the AID process. Second, increased mental and physical harm to the
child from surrogate motherhood vis-a-vis AID is not substantiated by
the evidence." 4 Furthermore, experimentation with embryos not im-
planted is already unlawful in many states. 5 Third, there is no evidence
that surrogate motherhood will increase the commercialization of pro-
108. Smith, supra note 32, at 654.
109. Id.
110. Scales, supra note 78, at 425.
111. The right/remedy (method) dichotomy is not novel. Merely because men and women are
not similarly situated as to the remedy does not, of itself, impact adversely on the right when men
and women are similarly situated. Cf Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 362 (1979) (White, J.,
dissenting).
112. Robertson, supra note 78, at 424-25.
113. Id. at 433-34. By requiring greater screening for surrogate motherhood and not for AID, a
state may generate more equal protection concerns. The Constitution may require that AID donors
be screened as well. Many would agree with this proposition, but it may not be constitutionally
mandated. As to the remedy or means by which men and women exercise their right to procreate,
they are not similarly situated. This fact will not, however, work to deny the right altogether. Cf
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (a state may regulate the right to terminate a pregnancy, but
cannot deny such a right).
114. Robertson, supra note 78, at 434.
115. Andrews, supra note 41, at 51-52.
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creation any more than AID. "6 Any advertisement of surrogate services
would be subject to state regulation. Fourth, there has also been no evi-
dence that surrogate motherhood vis-A-vis AID will confuse family line-
age or blur the meaning of the traditional family. 1 7 The American view
is that the family has the right to decide when and how to increase its
membership.118
It is important to note that most of the criticisms against surrogate
motherhood were previously advanced against another form of artificial
reproduction-AID.119 Thus, no valid reasons exist against providing
infertile women the same rights as infertile men. "[A] legal distinction
based on the natural lottery of physical equipment is not reasonable."' 120
Moreover, perceived immorality alone is not sufficient to justify limiting
the reproductive rights of others without a showing of tangible harm to
some legitimate state interest.'
21
C. Equal Protection Right of Procreation
The differential treatment of infertile men and women by artificial
reproduction statutes has been framed up to this point in terms of equal-
ity. As Professor Peter Westen has shown, however, a claim of equality
always masks a claim of substantive right. 2 2 Here, the substantive right
is the right of procreation.
The roots of the right of procreation can be found in Skinner v.
Oklahoma.2 3 In Skinner, the Supreme Court stated that marriage and
procreation are among "the basic civil rights of man."' 24 However, in
Skinner and in more recent cases dealing with procreation, the opinions
presuppose that procreation will take place within a marriage or a tradi-
tional family 125 and assume that the conception and bearing of children
was natural.' 26 Whether these precedents will apply to the surrogate
motherhood relationship would be conjecture at this point.
116. See Graham, supra note 96, at 304-05.
117. Robertson, supra note 78, at 425; see also Kass, "Making Babies"Revisited, 54 Pun. INTER-
EST 32 (1979); Kass, Making Babies--the New Biology and the "Old" Morality, 26 Pun. INTEREsT
18 (1972).
118. Robertson, supra note 78, at 435.
119. See R. SNOWDEN & G.D. MITCHELL, supra note 8, at 117, 121, 127.
120. Robertson, supra note 78, at 428 (footnote omitted).
121. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 545-46 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
122. Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1982).
123. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
124. Id. at 541.
125. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
126. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
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The right to procreate was given a shot in the arm by Roe v.
Wade 127 and its progeny. Whether the right of privacy will protect an
infertile woman's right to procreate with the aid of a surrogate is debata-
ble. As Professor Robertson has eloquently stated, "[f]reedom to have
sex without reproduction does not guarantee freedom to have reproduc-
tion without sex. Full procreative freedom would include both the free-
dom not to reproduce and the freedom to reproduce when, with whom,
and by what means one chooses."1 8 However, it is difficult to envision
today's Supreme Court expanding Roe to include the affirmative right to
procreate.
The importance of the right of procreation is not necessarily
founded upon the concept of an equal protection fundamental right,"2 9
but that the right of procreation is impinged by artificial reproduction
statutes which classify on the basis of sex. Therefore, impingement on
the right of procreation solidifies the view that contemporary artificial
reproduction statutes are unconstitutional, for they not only frustrate the
right, but also classify on the basis of sex.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDY
After a court declares a statutory scheme unconstitutional, it must
fashion an appropriate remedy. Basically, a court may fashion three
types of remedies for the violation.
The first remedy for the court is to refuse to enforce the unconstitu-
tional statute.1 30 Such a remedy would not be appropriate in this case for
two related reasons. Technically, the typical case in which a court
should refuse to enforce a statute is when the statute affirmatively re-
stricts the rights of a particular class."' The AID statutes are not within
such a class of statutes. Instead, they were passed for some public good
127. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
128. Robertson, supra note 78, at 406 (emphasis in original).
129. Only a few rights have been classified as fundamental equal protection rights. Among them
are voting rights, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Cipriano v.
City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966);
Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); certain criminal
procedural rights, eg., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12
(1956); the right of interstate travel, eg., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); United States v.
Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966); and possibly the right to privacy concerning decisions of intimacy and
procreation, eg., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
130. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-80 (1803); cf Norton v. Shelby
County, 118 U.S. 425, 442 (1886) ("An unconstitutional act is not a law... it is ... as inoperative as
though it had never been passed.").
131. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
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(i.e., to legitimize AID children and to treat the husband of the mother
as the natural father). Pragmatically, refusing to enforce AID statutes
helps no one and hinders the fundamental right of procreation. To deny
to infertile men that which has been denied to infertile women is like
throwing the baby out with the bath water. Such a result would be
ludicrous.
The second remedy for the court is that espoused by Professor Ely
for statutes struck down due to gender-based classifications. Ely writes
that a court should render unconstitutional a statute which discriminates
on the basis of sex, and, if the statute were to be reenacted by the legisla-
ture, the court should uphold it.'32 Ely rests this novel approach on the
observation that many, if not most, laws that discriminate on the basis of
sex were initially passed before women's suffrage 133 or at least before wo-
men were a political force.134 Ely points out that women in America are
not discrete nor insular nor even a minority.1 35 This is a pivotal fact in
Ely's view of equal protection analysis. Without a finding that the group
discriminated against is a discrete and insular minority, Ely finds no rea-
son for the court to aggressively scrutinize legislation affecting it.' 36
Although logical, Ely's remedy is nevertheless overly simplistic when
viewed in light of the current political process. No doubt women are a
political force to be reckoned with at the national level. However, their
national force has not been converted into any real grass roots force at
the state level.1 37 AID statutes are state statutes passed by state legisla-
tures, and state legislatures are typically male dominated. 3  Ely's rem-
edy gives the ultimate power back to those who abused it in the first
instance. Such a result cannot help but conjure up images of the prover-
bial fox guarding the chicken coop; at best, the chickens are left with an
uneasy feeling.
The third remedy for the court is to judicially refashion the right at
issue. A similar process is often undertaken to keep from declaring a law
132. J. ELY, supra note 61, at 169-70.
133. The nineteenth amendment became effective in 1920. Therefore, laws passed before 1920
would fall into this class. AID statutes, as previously noted, were first passed in 1964 (Georgia) and,
thus, would not fall within the class.
134. Professor Ely does not point to any specific date when women became a political force in
the United States.
135. J. ELY, supra note 61, at 164.
136. Id.
137. Although this statement is illogical on its face, it is nevertheless true. In this regard, the
women's movement is much like the labor movement, which also historically has had greater power
on the national rather than the state level.
138. In state legislatures, maleness is the norm. Presently, 83% of all state legislators are men.
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unconstitutional. A typical example is to read the term "man" to include
"woman." ''  Essentially, the court would take notice of the purposes of
the AID statute and extend its benefits to the class discriminated against
(i.e., infertile women, their husbands, and any children born of surrogate
motherhood arrangements). Such a result would not only promote the
purposes of the AID statutes, but also promote those purposes more per-
fectly. One adverse to what has been labeled substantive due process or,
more cynically, super-legislating, may cry foul to such a remedy. After
all, the result would make surrogate motherhood or something akin to it
lawful, a decision the legislature should make. Furthermore, such a rem-
edy is quite similar to the remedy ordered by the Supreme Court in Roe
v. Wade and would be subject to all the criticism mounted against Roe.
These fears, however, are unfounded. We are concerned with an equal
protection case and not a substantive due process case. We are not di-
rectly concerned with the nebulous right of privacy, but a classification
based on sex. We are also not dealing with the creation of a "new" right
as in Roe, but with a right already expressed by legislatures and con-
ferred to infertile men. Finally, conferring this right to infertile women is
not comparable to the step taken by the Supreme Court in Roe. Ex-
tending a right previously denied to a class on account of sex should
never be viewed as a quantum leap."
V. CONCLUSION
Advances in science and technology now permit an infertile woman
to exercise her right of procreation through the aid of a surrogate. How-
ever, the offspring born of a surrogate arrangement is technically illegiti-
mate, and the woman must adopt the child to obtain the rights of a
natural parent. No such obstacles are present when an infertile man ex-
ercises his right of procreation through the aid of a semen donor. To the
contrary, AID statutes affirmatively remove these obstacles, but only for
infertile men. As previously noted, the classification drawn by these arti-
ficial reproduction statutes is unconstitutional because it violates the
equal protection clause. The only appropriate remedy is to extend the
benefit conferred by AID statutes to infertile women. This may be a de
facto call for recognition of surrogate motherhood, but it is a de facto call
required by the Constitution. Any other conclusion would relegate wo-
139. This is often the tack used by courts when confronted with a criminal statute that contains
the term "man." But see Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (statutory rape law
protecting females under 18 survived equal protection challenge of male charged with its violation).
140. See Robertson, supra note 78, at 429.
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men to second class citizenship. Any other result would hamper the ex-
ercise of a right as fundamental as any-the right to procreate.
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